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Roe v. Wade: What Rights the Biological Father?
By Elizabeth Hughes Georgius*
In the Abortion Cases handed down in January, 1973, the Su-
preme Court determined that a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy is a personal matter, protected from undue state interfer-
ence by her constitutional right to privacy.' Although this "right to
privacy" is not explicit in any clause of the Constitution or its amend-
ments, it has come to be recognized as one of those implied personal
guarantees fundamental to the realization of the American democratic
ideal. Privacy is deemed to be a right which emanates from and is
peripheral to those expressly preserved by the Bill of Rights and an
element essential to their full exercise;2 accordingly, protections for
express rights, including 14th Amendment prohibitions against state
action, extend to a guarantee of privacy in the exercise of those rights."
The Court remains divided in its opinion of what constitutes the spe-
cific source of this fundamental right. It may be derived from the
intent and purposes of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights4 as "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' 5 as included within the "pe-
numbras" of the first eight amendments,' as preserved to individuals
by the Ninth Amendment,7 or as protected against undue state restric-
tion by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States gave early recognition to government's propensity to invade
* A.B., 1963, University of New Mexico; M.A., 1968, California State Univer-
sity, San Diego; J.D., 1975, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965).
3. Id. at484.
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, L, concurring);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
6. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 461 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
7. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, L, concurring).
8. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
9. 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928).
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individuals' privacy, and to the operation of the Bill of Rights in pro-
tecting against abuse. That personal privacy is a protected right was
first clearly enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut,'- where the Court
struck down as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy Connecticuts
statute banning the dissemination and use of birth control information
and devices. The Court has continued to clarify the extent and nature
of this protected right as applied to domestic concerns in recent deci-
sions. Thus, an implicit right to freedom from undue state interfer-
ence has been extended to choice of marriage partner,1 to procrea-
tion,12 and to contraception. 13
Striking down Texas' antiabortion and Georgia's regulated abor-
tion statutes in the Abortion Cases, the Court held that the decision
to abort belongs to the individual woman in consulation with her doc-
tor during the first three months of pregnancy, and continues to be
her decision in accordance with limited state regulations during the
final six months before birth.'4 The text of the several opinions of
individual justices does not suggest what participation in the decision
the father is to be afforded, although by footnote the Court recognized
that the prospective father may have an interest that must be consid-
ered.' ,5 That he has an interest in the outcome of the woman's preg-
nancy is not doubted. Regardless of his marital relationship to her,
he is bound at law to support his child;' 6 if he has or shares custody,
he is responsible for the child's discipline and education 7 and shares
in benefit from the child's earnings and services.' 8 Under some state
10. 381 U.S. 4791 (1965).
11. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
12. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (dictum).
13. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
15. Id. at 165 n.67.
16. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
17. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1973). 'The parent entitled to the cus-
tody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances. If
the support and education which the father of a legitimate child is able to give is inade-
quate, the mother must assist him to the extent of her ability;" CA.L. Civ. CODE § 196a
(West Supp. 1974). "The father as well as the mother of an illegitimate child must
give him support and education suitable to his circumstances . . . ." N.Y. FAM.
CouRT Act § 413 (McKinney 1973). "The father of a minor child is chargeable with
the support of his child, and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such
means, may be required to pay for his support a fair and reasonable sum according
to his means, as the court may determine." DEL.. ANN. CODE tit. 13, § 702 (1972
Supp.). "The legal duty to support a minor child rests solely upon the father if he
is living and able to provide such support, but if the father is not living or is unable
to provide such support, then the mother if she is living and able shall provide such
support."
1 18. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1197 (Welst 1973). 'The father and mother of a
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statutes the father can expect support from his adult child if the father
is indigent.19 However, these are interests that depend upon the birth
and survival of the child. What interests the prospective father may
have in his unbdrn child, and whether they are of sufficient substan-
tiality to require his participation in the abortion decision is the subject
of this note. It is assumed that if the man has an interest in the fetus,
such an interest is potentially protectable under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. It is also assumed that, to the extent his interests sup-
port his participation in the decision, they are of necessity antagonistic
to the woman's since his power to consent implies his power to with-
hold consent and so nullify her decision to abort.
The Nature of the Woman's Interests
Before attempting to identify the prospective father's interests
and the rights that protect them, it is well to review what the Court
identified as the woman's interests. The Court recognized that the
decision to abort is a decision relating to the care and maintenance
of personal health, and as such is principally of individual and private
concern. The woman who elects to abort is deemed to be acting to
safeguard her mental and physical health. 0
Acknowledging the potentially grave risks of an unwanted 1preg-
nancy,21 the Court observed that by tradition the individual's interest
in preserving good health is of such a personal nature that it remains
outside the domain of government regulation except when the state
legitimate unmarried minor child are equally entitled to its custody, services and
earnings. If either the father or mother be dead or unable or refuse to take the cus-
tody or has abandoned his or her family, the other is entitled to its custody, services
and earnings." DEL. ANN. CODE tit. 13, § 703 (1972 Supp.). "The father and mother
of a minor child are equally entitled to its services and earnings, and if one of the
parents is dead, or has abandoned the child, or has been deprived of its custody by
court decree, the other parent shall be entitled to such services and earnings." See
also CoNN. GEN. ANN. STAT. §§ 17-43 (Supp. 1973). "Any parent whose child has
been supported by the welfare commissioner for at least three years immediately pre-
ceding such child's eighteenth birthday shall not be entitled to such child's earnings
or services during such child's minority." Accord, TEx. VERN. Cry. STAT. art. 2337
(1971).
19. E.g., CoNN. GEN. ANN.-STAT. § 17-320 (Supp. 1973). "When any person
becomes poor and unable to support himself or herself and family, and has a husband
or wife, and, if such person is under eighteen, a father or mother, or if such person
is under sixty-five, a child able, jointly or severally, to provide such support, it shall
be provided by them" (emphasis added). CAL. Cv. CoDE § 206 (West Supp. 1974).
"It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person in need who
is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their
ability."
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
21. Id.
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can identify an overwhelming societal interest which justifies its inter-
ference." While the discovery of antisepsis and improved gynocologic
and obstetric care have markedly reduced the dangers of childbirth, 23
these risks continue to constitute a significant threat to the life and
health of the expectant woman.2 4  The Court recognized the immedi-
acy of the risks she faces, and admitted certain validity to the woman's
claims to the freedom to choose whether she shall undergo these haz-
ards, whether she shall tax physical and mental health for the major
part of the ensuing eighteen years in meeting the stress and distress
of parenting an unwanted child, and whether, if unmarried, she shall
bear the stigma of giving birth to an illegitimate child .2
Reviewing the status of abortion in the Western world and the
development of society's attitudes toward it from earliest history, the
Court observed that while abortion was not encouraged, it was not
severely proscribed until the 19th century. The civil, criminal and
canon laws relating to or regulating abortion were inspired by notions
that a father holds a 1roprietary right in his offspring" or that the
quickened fetus is a human soul.27  The Court saw a relationship be-
tween the enactment of criminal abortion laws in 19th-century Ameri-
ca and the high mortality rate associated with abortion, far exceeding
that of natural full-term childbirth.28  The state had sound basis for
22. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905).
23. In 1937 the techniques of blood transfusion and sulfa drug therapy, as well
as the newly developed antibiotic therapy, were introduced into the obstetrical ward for
routine use. The benefits from these advances in medical technology were most directly
felt by those segments of the population which utilized the obstetrical ward-urban
whites; the great number of non-white births were home deliveries, and most of these,
without benefit of these new developments. Consequently, these advances are most
clearly reflected in the white figures.
Maternal mortality, rates cited per 10,000:
Year All Births Whites Non-Whites
1935 58.2 53.1 94.6
1936 56.8 51.2 97.2
1937 48.9 43.6 85.8
1938 43.5 37.7 84.9
46 Maternal Mortality, VITAL SrATIsncs: SPEc IL. REPoRTs no. 17, at 438 (1940).
Projecting these rates to the standard per 100,000:
1936 568 512 972
1937 489 436 858
1938 435 377 849
24. Maternal mortality rate for all births in the United States in 1970, most re-
cent year for which complete statistics are available, is 26.8 per 100,000. U.S. DEP'T
oF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFA.RE, MATRNAL MoRTALITY: VrrAL STATISTICS op
Tr UNTED STATES (1973).
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
26. Id. at 130.
27. Id. at 130-32.
28. 19 C.H. HAAGENSEN AND W. LLoYD, A HUNDEmm YEARs or MEDIcIn 119-
31, 285-94 (1943).
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its proscription of induced abortion in its legitimate desire to protect
the life and health of the pregnant woman. 9
Today the dangers to the woman from abortion under clinically
protected conditions are less than those of childbirth after full-term
pregnancy,30 although the margin of difference is reduced as the preg-
nancy progresses and the fetus grows.3" Only in the final weeks of
the pregnancy do the risks of induced abortion compare unfavorably
with the dangers of childbirth. 32  Accordingly, insofar as the interest
in maternal health is concerned, the mother's interest as well as the
state's lies in terminating the pregnancy, and the earlier the better.
If maternal health is the sole determinative, there can be no valid
interference with the woman's decision to abort.
To the extent that the decision to abort grows out of the woman's
interest in preserving her health, and to the extent that the right to
privacy protecting her freedom to make personal health decisions with-
out undue interference is one of those fundamental and essential rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, regulation by the state must be care-
fully limited. Only where abortion interferes with the interests of oth-
ers can the state intervene to determine whether those other interests
in the continuation of the pregnancy outweigh the woman's interest
in her health and have sufficient constitutional standing to turn the
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148-49 (1973).
30. Maternal mortality statistics include all deaths immediately attributable to the
complications of pregnancy, premature and full-term childbirth; abortion mortality sta-
tistics include all maternal deaths associable with abortion complications, with pre-ex-
isting complications attributable to "problem" pregnancies as well as septic abortions
(clinical completion of "botched" attempts, presumed to be illegally undertaken abor-
tion attempts). Statistics are for the year 1970; rates per 100,000:
Maternal Deaths Abortion Mortality
United States 26.8 8.2
New York City 29.0 4.8
Note: New York's antiabortion law was liberalized to take effect in
July, 1970.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MATERNAL MORTALITY; VITAL SFA-
TIsTcs OF TE UNIrr STATES (1973).
31. Abortion mortality in New York City for the two-year period immediately
prior to the liberalization of New York's antiabortion law, July 1, 1968 through June
30, 1970, is reported at rates per 10,000; projected to rates per 100,000:
All First Second and Third
Abortion Trimester Trimesters
5.2 2.2 17.5
64 PLANNED PARENTHOOD WORLD POPULATION NEWSLETrER, Maternal Mortality (Jan.
12, 1973).
32. "The risk of maternal death if pregnancy is allowed to go to term is far
greater than that associated with early abortion. The risk to life from abortion in the
third trimester is no greater than that of pregnancy and childbirth." PLANNED PARENT-
HOOD-WoRLD POPULATION, LEGAL ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: FACTS AND HIGH-
LIGHTS (1973).
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balance against her. In Roe v. Wade the Court found such an inter-
est in the unborn fetus when it has reached a stage of viability, that
is, that stage of development when it has the biological capacity to
survive independent of the mother's womb, and sanctioned the state's
intervention in the third trimester in behalf of the "potential person."33
In weighing the present potential life against the risks to mater-
nal health, the Court found that the state may preserve the fetus. How-
ever, where the balance must be struck between the life of the mother
and the present potential life of the fetus, the Court refuses to allow
the state to interfere with the woman's decision to abort even though
that decision is made during the final trimester of pregnancy.34 Here,
the Court is providing a clue to what kinds of interests will be of suf-
ficient weight to permit interference with the woman's decision
to abort.
The Nature of the Man's Interest
While the Court recognized that the prospective father may have
an interest in the fetus, it did not indicate what that interest might
be, or what weight it might carry as against the woman's interests.
In the contemporary medical, social, and legal context the question is
a new one. Traditionally, where a novel legal issue is presented, the
inquiry requires an analysis of -the specific claim and the factual
nexus out of which it comes. When the essential elements are clari-
fied, legal principles applicable to the new question may be established
by analogy to related or relatable phenomena for which legal prin-
ciples already have been established and applied. This analysis of
the question of natural father's rights will follow that plan.
In the abortion decision the man's claim of interest arises out
of his biological contribution to the formation of the fetus, and what-
ever expectancy the prospective father has in his future child which
the law recognizes as real and substantial begins with that biological
contribution.
The biological contribution
The prospective father's interest in the fetus qua fetus is probably a
proprietary interest in biological matter. To the extent that cellular
matter of the man is involved in formation of the embryo, the man
participates in the creative process and he has an element of control
in acquiescing to its occurrence. The embryo is not formed until the
man's semen is separated from his body and he has lost physical con-
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
34. Id. at 164-65.
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trol over the material. The Court has supported a personal claim to
control over one's own biology, albeit with limitation;85 but once the
biological material is separated from the individual, does he retain any
control over its disposition?
Analogous to the release of semen may be the intentional trans-
fer of human tissue from one individual into the body of another. Since
the biological definition of "tissue" is "any group of cells specialized
for a particular function,"'3 such fluids as blood and semen are familiar
tissues and invite comparison. The first marginally successful blood
transfusions were attempted in the late 19th century; and even though
tissue transfer is of so recent origin, with the rapid development of
biological and medical technology other tissue matter is now being suc-
cessfully transferred from one human being to another. Today hu-
man tissue banks store blood, corneas and eyes, kidneys, bone and
semen for such transfer to living human beings. Since the transfer
of tissue and cellular matter from one human being to another is a
fairly recent phenomenon, the law surrounding the use of such bio-
logical materials is still developing. Under current practices the per-
son who yields up his tissue is a "donor" who gives (or whose legal
representative gives in the donor's behalf) formal consent to the re-
moval of the matter and retains no control or claim of title in it. The
language of the formal consent forms signed by donors is a complete
relinquishing of any control over the biological matter, and includes
giving full discretion to the recipient tissue bank in the disposition of
the material.3 7 While the donor of blood, for example, may yield up
his tissue in the name of a specific intended beneficiary, the particular
matter from the donor's body becomes a fungible stored for whatever
use the blood bank makes of it, including experimentation and even
discard.38 Similarly, tissue such as corneal matter removed from ca-
davers is stored as a fungible for use as required.3 9  Just as the donor
has given up control over the material, so also he owes no duty nor
35. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
36. A. LoEwY AND P. SmKERrZ, CELL STRUCTURE AND FuNCnON 10 (1963).
37. Text of consent form utilized by the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank of San
Francisco: "I voluntarily donate my blood to the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank to be
used as decided by the San Francisco Medical Society." Text of donor's intent form
utilized by the Eye Bank of the San Diego County Medical Society: "I hereby state
that it is my wish to donate to the Eye Bank of the San Diego County Medical Soci-
ety immediately following my death both or either of my eyes for such purposes as
the San Diego County Medical Society Eye Bank, in its sole discretion, deems advisa-
ble, including but not limited to transplantation of the cornea to the eye of a living
person."
38. Interview with James L. Kelley, M.D. American College of Surgeons; in San
Diego, California, December 20, 1973.
39. EYE BANK OF THE SAN DIEGo CouNTY MEDICAL SocETY, EYE BANK (1973).
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makes any warrant concerning that matter to any ultimate beneficiary
relating to the use of that material.
Where the tissue is sought for a specific use, as an organ of a
genetically related donor of specific tissue typing, and the donation
requires the hazard of major surgery on a live donor with the life-
long risks to the donor associable with the loss of that organ, the donor
appears to retain a claim to control insofar as the immediate use of
that gift organ is concerned. While a search of the literature has not
shown an instance of legal prosecution of such a claim of control, the
language of the release signed by the donor40 suggests a cause of ac-
tion would lie with the kidney donor who runs a substantial risk for
an identified beneficiary and discovers the organ was used instead for
experimentation or for a stranger beneficiary.41
The sperm donor, like the blood donor, yields up his semen after
having consented to the wholly discretionary use of the material by
the recipient agency. Unless the insemination of the recipient is per-
formed immediately upon collection of the sperm, the donor has no
knowledge of the actual use to which his tissue is put, nor, unless
he is husband to the intended beneficiary, does he know her identity.42
Here the similarities between blood and semen donations end, for the
blood transferred so anonymously to the beneficiary creates no new
focus of legal or moral obligations in either the donor or the benefici-
ary. Yet the transferred semen can and is intended to result in the
creation of a new human being, and with that child a new focus of
legal responsibilities is created for which the adults associated with
the child are answerable. Where the technique used is AI-H (artifi-
cial insemination utilizing the husband's semen), the question of pater-
nity is not raised; but when the technique used is AI-D (in which
the semen used is that of a donor who is not the husband of the bene-
ficiary), the question of paternity has arisen.
The Supreme Court of California recently considered the ques-
40. Partial test of "Living Related Donor" form utilized by the transplant unit
of the University of California Medical Center, San Francisco: "We ask that you sign
the following statement to indicate... that you wish to be a kidney donor for your
relative. I, -, . . . understand that this operation involves certain risks and I
also understand that the kidney may be rejected by the patient and will have to be
removed."
41. On the basis of the law governing contracts made for the benefit of a third
party, it appears that the intended beneficiary who suffers disability or death without
that kidney by dint of its misuse would also have a cause of action as a third party
beneficiary to the arrangement. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNT cis § 135
(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 Revised and Edited, 1973).
42. Interview with Marshall Taylor, M.D. Fellow, American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists; American Fertility Society; in San Diego, California, Decem-
ber 20, 1973.
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tion of who owed the paternal obligation of support to the minor child
born as the result of its mother's impregnation by AI-D.4 3  The court
held the legal responsibility for support and education of the child
lay in the husband, and in dictum indicated that the man whose semen
impregnated the mother by AI-D has no legal claim and no legal re-
sponsibility to the child.44 Other courts which have considered the
question have reached the same conclusion: the husband who has giv-
en his consent to the AI-D insemination of his wife assumes the full
liability as parent for support of the resulting child.45
When the question of the child's status was first raised in the
lower courts, two jurisdictions labeled the AI-D child "illegitimate"
despite the husband's consent to the procedure.4  Nevertheless, in
each instance the husband was held to be obligated to support the
child. The California case is the most recent, and the only one to
date rendered by a court of last resort. Here, the court held that
the AI-D child is legitimate and that the relationship of the husband
to the child is precisely that of the natural father.4 r
No record of litigation by the sperm donor claiming paternal
rights in the child has been found, and due to the anonymity surround-
ing the procedure such a claim is not likely to arise. However, the
case law assigning the paternal duty to support the child conceived
by AI-D to the spouse and not to the biological father would appear
to provide substantial basis for denying any parental claim in the bio-
logical father who merely provides sperm cells. Moreover, consider-
ing the practices relating to human tissue transfers in general-com-
plete absence of any control over disposition of biological materials and
the absence of any liability relating to their use-any claim of interest
in the fetus arising solely from the biological fact of paternity seems
quite tenuous.
The paternal expectancy
The birth of a child is considered an occasion for rejoicing and thanks-
giving among virtually all peoples and throughout man's cultural his-
tory.48 By custom and law the community recognizes that the parents,
43. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 28G, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
44. Id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
45. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964); Gur-
sky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963); Doornbos v. Doombos,
No. 54S. 14981 (Super. CL, Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954.
46. Ill. and N.Y.; see cases cited note 45 supra.
47. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 501-02, 66 Cal. Rptr.
7, 13 (1968).
48. R. Lowin, The Family as a Social Unit in PAERes oF Tim MscmoG AcAD-
EMY OF ScIENcE, ARTS AND LEnrERs (1933) [hereinafter cited as Lowm].
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and particularly the father, have acquired a valuable and tangible as-
set.49 Anglo-American law has considered the unborn child in several
situations; earliest cases involved questions arising under the law of
property related to the inheritance and succession rights of the child.
Further, under criminal law when feticide resulted from an intentional
act or when abortion was illegally undertaken or committed, paternal
and maternal interests were recognized in some jurisdictions. Most
recently under the law of torts there have been significant develop-
ments in the parental rights in the event of wrongful death of a pre-
maturely-born infant and the unborn fetus.
Under the law of property the rights of curtesy, inheritance, and
succession are inchoate and conditional until a legal person comes into
being, that is, until a child is born who survives independent of and
apart from its mother's body. 50 Trust law permits the creation of a
trust interest in an unborn, even an unconceived child, and traditional-
ly, required that such a child be represented by a guardian ad litem
in litigation affecting its potential interests. 51 However, in a recent
trust termination case in New York the eight-month fetus en ventre
sa mere was found not to have such legal identity that a guardian
would be required to protect its contingent interests."2 Thus, under
property law the interests of both parent and child are severely limited
during the period of gestation.
Violation of the criminal abortion laws resulting in destruction
of the fetus and injury or death to the woman raised a cause of action
in the husband against the abortionist; but his recovery was limited
to the expenses of the wife's medical care and funeral, if she died,
and recovery for his loss of consortium. 58 However, a factor in the
husband's recovery was the culpability, if any, of his wife in the abor-
tion. Where she actively solicited, or at least consented to the act,
the case law is mixed. Most jurisdictions found the woman's consent
to the abortion made her a willing participant in an illegal act; and
although she was not prosecuted as a conspirator, recovery for resul-
tant injuries or death was denied both spouses.5" In a few jurisdic-
tions the tort claim survived despite the woman's consent on the theory
49. Id.
50. R STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 273 (1940).
51. See RSTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TRusTS §§ 112, 340 (1959).
52. In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 547, 158 N.E.2d 841, 845. 186 N.Y.S.2d 265,
270 (1959).
53. The husband's cause of action was in tort; see W. PRossEx, TORTS §§ 36,
125 (4th ed. 1971).
54. Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934); Martin v. Morris, 163
Tenn. 186, 42 S.W.2d 207 (1931). See also Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 154
N.E. 251 (1926); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949).
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that consent is no defense since the act was criminal. 55 Two limita-
tions are noteworthy: recovery was limited to the person financially
responsible for the woman's expenses-her husband or her parent-
and recovery did not include damages for loss of the fetus.
Under tort law the parents of the child who is injured, maimed,
or killed by another's negligent action have recovered for their eco-
nomic losses: medical and burial expenses and loss of the child's serv-
ices and earnings. 0 However, by tradition the disappointment of the
prospective parents' expectations in their child by the destruction of
the fetus has not been recognized as being of legal substantiality to
support a claim. Accordingly, the prospective father could not re-
cover for his inchoate personal interests against the tortfeasor whose
actions destroyed the fetus his wife carried. Similarly, the expectant
mother did not have a recognizable cause of action in the loss of her
unborn; her recovery was limited to the pain and suffering of the mis-
carriage. 57
If the child is first live born and then dies as the result of injuries
sustained, a cause of action is recognized in the child under the wrong-
ful death statutes. 58 Since the recovery is based on the wrongful death
of a once-living person, the general rule is that the newborn must sur-
vive the birth process. Once the live birth occurs, there is a valid
claim even though death follows soon thereafter; 9 and although no
55. Lembo v. Donnell, 116 Maine 505, 101 A. 469 (1917). See also Pleak v.
Cottingham, 94 Ind. App. 365, 178 N.E. 309 (1931); Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110
Ohio St. 381, 144 N.E. 264 (1924).
56. Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alas. 1962); Drabbels v. Skelley Oil
Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d
140 (1964); Endres v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Padillow v. Elrod,
424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d
502 (1966); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Lawrence v.
Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
57. Endres v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 486, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65, 69 (1969). See also Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178
(1954); Graf v. Taggert, 43 NJ. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Marko v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966).
58. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 869(2) (Council Draft No. 27, 1970).
See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Prates v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill.
422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953)Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838
(1949); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Jasinsky v. Potts,
153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Johnson v. Charleston & W. Carolina R'y,
234 S.C. 448, 108 S.E.2d 777 (1959); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.
2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
59. Torrigan v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Peterson v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197 N.E.2d 194 (1964).
Spring 1974] RIGHTS OF THE FATHER
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
minimal survival time has been clearly indicated, the newborn in these
cases survived for a matter of several hours6 ° or days. 61
Recent developments in the law have extended the elements of
recovery so that some courts have come to recognize that certain in-
tangible interests have a recoverable value under their wrongful death
statutes: filial loyalty, affection, companionship, and parental pride.
Furthermore, under the broadly worded statutes in a limited number
of jurisdictions, the question was asked, what recoverable interests has
the prospective father in the fetus. In a few of these jurisdictions
the courts have permitted recovery by the parents for their dis-
appointed expectations when the death is that of an unborn in utero.62
In these cases the fetus was fully formed and viable; in allowing re-
covery the courts pointed out that the fetus had reached such maturity
that, had the tort not occurred and had natural birth taken place pre-
maturely, the child could probably have survived. The courts accepted
the medical rule of thumb that the fetus must complete the sixth
month of development in order to have a reasonable chance of sur-
vival.63  Thus, under the language of the South Carolina statute the
parents of an eight-month stillborn fetus were granted relief,64 but the
parents of a six-month stillborn fetus were denied.65 However, in a
relatively early Georgia case not followed by any other jurisdiction
nor repeated in Georgia, the parents of a "quickened" child won re-
versal of demurrer where the stillborn fetus was in the fifth month
of development. 66
No case has been found where either &arent has recovered for
the wrongful death of a fetus which was neither viable nor quick, and
in those cases where a claim was based on the wrongful death of a
not yet viable fetus, recovery has invariably been denied. Thus, under
some wrongful death statutes the paternal interest in the unborn fetus
does have legal substantiality once the fetus reaches a stage of viabili-
ty; but where the fetus is too immature to survive independently of
the mother, no paternal claim is recognized.
In every report of litigation and recovery under these statutes the
prospective father was married to the expectant mother; but the tort
60. Peterson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197 N.E.2d 194
(1964).
61. Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955);
Torrigan v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
62. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
63. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Rainy v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954).
64. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964).
65. West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
66. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
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claim made by the prospective father not married to the expectant
mother could probably not be denied so long as he is able to show
that he has lost the qualifying compensable paternal expectancy. This
conclusion is based on three recent Supreme Court decisions in which
the Court determined that under the dictates of the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment the legitimacy
of the parents' liaison per se cannot properly be considered as deter-
mining the legal interests of parent and child. 7  The Court is ac-
knowledging that the parents' marital status does not of itself deter-
mine whether a family unit exists. Where circumstances give rise to
the expectations of family life, the Court has extended the protection
of law, striking down local laws and practices which defined a special
class as "illegitimate" and which on the basis of that classification dis-
criminated unequally against parents and children.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment the states are barred from
making any law which would deny equal protection of its laws to per-
sons within its jurisdiction.6  In enacting a law that identifies a group
of persons and singles that group out for special treatment, the state
has created a classification subject to review under this amendment.
If, on the basis of that classification, the effect of the law is to limit
the group's free exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights,
that class as well as the law are "suspect." 69  In Korematsu v. United
States70 the Court first defined as "suspect" any law which has this
effect of curtailing the civil rights of an individual or group, and sub-
sequent decisions have established that before such a law can be sus-
tained as valid it is subject to the "most rigid scrutiny ' 71 of the review-
ing court; in order to support such unequal treatment the state is re-
quired to sustain a "very heavy burden of justification. 72  The show-
ing of a merely rational connection between the proposed class of per-
sons and a valid public purpose is insufficient to justify discriminatory
invasion of the civil rights of a class; 73 there must be some "overrid-
67. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee
& Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
68. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws."
69. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
70. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
71. Id.; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
72. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
73. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
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ing statutory purpose,"74 some "compelling governmental interest,"75
some "pressing public necessity" '76 which cannot be satisfied by some
alternative means which does not make such unequal and burdensome
distinctions.77
In the companion cases of Levy v. Louisiana7- and Glona v.
American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co.7" the Court held the
classification of "illegitimate" to be one of those which "has no ra-
tional basis,"80 creating an "invidious" distinction invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment."1 In Levy a workman's compensation claim
was filed by the illegitimate children of a woman who died as the
result of an accident on the job; in Glona the mother of an illegitimate
child sued the insurance company from whom she had purchased a
life insurance policy for specific performance when the covered child
was killed in an accident. Both defendants refused payment on the
theory that the illegitimacy of the children barred recovery. The
Court found the defendants to be in error and the classification "ille-
gitimate' to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment under these
circumstances. 82  The classification would deny children born out of
wedlock and their parents the protection of state laws equal to that
extended to "legitimate" children and their parents, and in neither
instance could the defendant show a compelling state interest in deny-
ing recovery on account of the circumstances of the child's birth."5
In Stanley v. Illinois84 the Court refused to find such a compell-
ing state interest supportive of a discriminatory state practice based
on a child's legitimate birth,8 5 and removed one more of the legal
disabilities imposed by tradition where children are born outside the
marital relationship. The Court declared the rights of the natural fa-
ther to the custody of his children and to due process when that cus-
tody may be granted to a nonparent to be independent of his marital
relationship with the mother of his children. 86  When the mother of
89 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71(1971).
74. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
75. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
76. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
77. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
78. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
79. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
80. Id. at 75.
81. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). Se,- also Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
82. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
83. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
84. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
85. Id. at 649.
86. Id. at 656-58.
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Stanley's three illegitimate children died, the state granted custody
to nonparents without Stanley's being notified of the proceedings
and without his consent to the arrangement. Acting under the equal
protection clause, the Court struck down Illinois' statutory distinction
between married and unmarried fathers by declaring unconstitutional
the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit to raise their children
and by affirming to unwed fathers the same procedural protections
afforded married fathers.8 7  Where the state proposes to place the child
in the custody of a nonparent, the natural father, be he married or
unmarried to the mother of his child, must be shown to be an unfit
parent in a formal hearing of which he has notice; and, no presump-
tion of his unfitness as a parent can arise out of the illegitimacy of
the child's birth. 8
On the basis of the holdings in these three cases and the sup-
portive facts of Stanley, it appears that the tort claim by unmarried
prospective fathers for the wrongful death of a viable fetus should be
successful where that father can show a sufficiently continuing rela-
tionship with the expectant mother, giving rise to a "family unit" which
could support his claim of paternal expectations frustrated.
On March 4, 1974, the Supreme Court denied review of the re-
cent Florida case, Jones v. Smith,89 in which the district court held
that the unmarried prospective father has no right to prevent the mother
from terminating her pregnancy. The district court declared that
the decision to abort is a personal one, to be made by the mother
and her attending physician. While the Court is not formally accept-
ing or rejecting the lower court's decision in declining to review it,
the Court allows the decision to stand and appears to be giving at
least tacit approval to the outcome. Whether the holdings in Stanley,
Glona, and Levy are applicable to the abortion issue awaits considera-
tion.90 If the principle applies, the claim of right by the prospective
father who is husband to the expectant mother can be afforded no
greater consideration than that of the unwed father.
Paternal expectations in marriage
When the prospective father is husband to the woman, he has a spe-
cial relationship to her that is recognized, encouraged, and protected
87. Id. at 658.
88. Id. at 657.
89. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Mar. 4,
1974).
90. Appeals have been filed for review in two Florida cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of the state's requirement of written "spousal or parental consent" to abor-
tion. In both cases the lower courts declared the requirement an unconstitutional limi-
tation on the wife's privacy. Gerstein v. Coe, appeal docketed, No. 73-1157, 42
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by law. Anthropologists consider marriage to be among those basic
and virtually universal social institutions common to the social systems
of the most unsophisticated and the most technically advanced peo-
ples." Its primary purpose is the identifying and protecting of the
young; 92 it is essential to avoiding the universally acknowledged tabu
of incest,93 to observing religious requirements of clan and com-
munity,94 and to preserving and protecting property interests including
sexual access to the female.9 5 Since generations of societal experi-
ence have shown the desirability of procreation and nurture of children
within a family unit, it is not surprising that American law confirms
this preference by extending to it certain benefits.
Marriage customs and laws of twentieth-century America reflect
these general social values, encouraging marriage through laws which
sustain it, assigning substantial importance to the procreation and nur-
ture of children within marriage and surrounding the procreative proc-
ess with special protections. While the marriage "contract" does not
impose a duty of begetting or bearing children,96 procreation is an
expectation of marriage and is legally protected. r Not surprisingly
the statutes and case law of the many jurisdictions in this area of the
law are remarkably similar. Thus, a marriage is voidable if either
spouse is impotent98 or if the woman is pregnant by another man at
the time of marriage and knowingly conceals the fact."9 Insisting on
U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1974); Poe v. Gerstein, appeal docketed, No. 73-1283,
42 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974).
91. TAYLOR, Society in ANTHROPOLOGY (1881); F. BOAS, GENERAL ANTHROPOL-
oGY (1938); A. KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY: RACE, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY,
PREISTORY (1948); R. RADCLIFFE-BRoWN, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIiVr
SocIErY (1952).
92. Lowin, supra note 48.
93. R. LowiE, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1934).
94. LowiE, supra note 48.
95. E. DuRmEi, PRIMITIVE CLASSIFICATION (1965).
96. Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, 80, 171 N.E. 911, 913 (1930).
97. In order to reduce the likelihood of producing defective children, several states
have imposed sometimes severe restrictions on the marriage of epileptics, imbidiles, the
feeble-minded or the insane where the woman is under the age of forty-five; similarly,
marriage is restricted where one of the parties is infected with venereal disease in a
contagious stage. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4201 (West Supp. 1974), DEL. ANN. CODE
tit. 13 § 101 (1972 Supp.); BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. § 44-104; KAN. ANN. STAT. § 23-
120 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-102, 103 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-46
(Supp. 1973); WASH. REv. CODE § 26-04.010 (1973).
98. Marriage is voidable for impotency in thirty-two states; those not recognizing
this as ground include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. -CoUtcmN ON MARRIAGE RrLA-
TIONS, GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 91 (1973).
99. States voiding marriage where the wife concealed her premarital pregnancy
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the practice of birth control against the wishes of the marriage part-
ner and without justifying health reasons has been found to be deser-
tion and grounds for divorce in several jurisdictions. 100 Until recent
reforms were adopted the principal ground for divorce was adultery.10 1
At common law the strong proscriptions against adultery were founded
on the fear of introducing spurious offspring into the family unit, adul-
terating the issue of the husband and turning the inheritance away
from the father's own blood to a stranger unqualified to share.10 2
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the married head of
household may elect to file a joint return with his wife and thereby
realize what is usually a reduction of his tax liability.10 3
Even though the current trend in domestic law is to erase the
legal distinctions between issue of marital and extramarital liaisons,
the Court in a recent 5-4 decision chose to preserve the distinction
made in Louisiana's law of intestate succession which has the effect
of granting an economic advantage to children who are born in mar-
riage. Despite its earlier decisions in Levy and Glona the Court held
in Labine v. Vincent'" that there was no violation of the equal pro-
tection clause in Louisiana's preserving the classification "illegitimate"
where by statute it barred any intestate claim made by the illegitimate
child who was never legitimated or adopted by his deceased father.
In denying the illegitimate child an equal share with his legitimate
half-siblings, the Court found that the state was "properly regulating
property rights incident to family life" and "making a valid legislative
choice" which lies "within the power of the State."'' 05 On the strength
of this decision the intestacy laws barring the father from taking from
or through his illegitimate child would also remain intact. 0 6
by another man include Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming. CoUN cIL ON
MARRoAGE RELATONS, GROUNDS FOR DrvoRcE 91 (1973).
100. Jones v. Jones, 186 Md. 312, 46 A.2d 617 (1946); Brown v. Brown, 78 N.H.
337, 100 A. 604 (1917); Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (1942);
Baker v. Baker, 99 Ore. 213, 195 P. 347 (1921); Hathaway v. Hathaway, 71 S.D. 310,
24 N.W.2d 33 (1946).
101. Adultery is named as ground for divorce in all states excepting California and
Iowa.
102. See McAlister v. McAlister, 71 Tex. 695, 697, 10 S.W. 294, 295 (1888). For
a general discussion of ecclesiastic and common law origins see Bashford v. Wells, 78
Kan. 295, 96 P. 663 (1908); State v. Bigelow, 88 Vt. 464, 92 A. 978 (1915).
103. INTERNAL REvENUE CODE OF 1954, §§ 1(a), 6013.
104. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
105. Id. at 536-37.
106. E.g., N.Y. ESTATES, PowERs AND TRusrs LAw § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1973):
(a) For the purposes of this article ... [a]n illegitimate child is the legitimate child
of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent
jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring
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In sustaining the special tax allowance for married persons and
preserving Louisiana's succession laws, the Court appears to be affirm-
ing legislative determinations that procreation within wedlock should
be encouraged, and authorizing a kind of benign discrimination in be-
half of families created within marriage. Whether the state's appar-
ently valid encouragement can or should be extended to granting the
husband a kind of "domestic veto power" over the wife's decision to
abort by authorizing a benign discrimination in the husband's behalf
has yet to be considered.
Benign Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment
Were the state in an abortion statute to separate out the husband
from all other prospective fathers as a member of a special class due
favored treatment, that is, allowed consensual participation in his
wife's decision to abort, it would thereby be granting an unequal
right to a limited class of persons. What is the constitutionality of
such discrimination favoring, not restricting, a special class? Since this
is the reverse of treatment proscribed by the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, does the amendment apply?
Recently the Court analyzed a provision of the federal Voting
Rights Act of 1965107 as just such a discriminatory grant of special
favoring treatment to a limited group of persons.108 Under § (4) (e)
of the act Spanish-speaking citizens who had completed the sixth grade
in an accredited school in Puerto Rico were guaranteed the right to
vote, regardless of New York law making the right to register and
vote conditional upon English literacy. Since the federal act did not
curtail a civil right, but rather extended it, the Court began with a
presumption of the statute's constitutionality and applied a "permis-
sive standard" in testing its validity.' 09 This permissive standard re-
quires only that the law not be arbitrary and that a "reasonable rela-
tion" exist between the effect of the law and its declared purpose.10
"[The] principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in
laws denying fundamental rights. . . is inapplicable.""'
paternity in a proceeding instituted during to pregnancy of the mother or within two
years from the birth of the child. (b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving
spouse, issue, mother, maternal kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters
of administration as if the deceased were legitimate, provided that the father may in-
herit or claim such letters only if an order of filiation has been made in accordance
with the provisions of [paragraph (a)] (emphasis added). See also LA. CIv. CODE
§§ 1486, 1488 (1952).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970).
108. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
109. Id. at 657.
110. Id. at 650-52.
111. Id. at 657.
[Vol. I
Just what rights can be so extended in a benign discrimination
to special classes of persons is not yet clear; but it is not unreasonable
to suggest that they will include "penumbral" rights which have been
found to be of a fundamental nature. 12  Under Griswold and Wade
the right to privacy in decisions concerning procreation and abortion
is fundamental, and so could properly be extended to that special class
-married prospective fathers-by benign discrimination." 3
Where benign discrimination is not merely an extension of special
favoring treatment to one class but has -the simultaneous effect of im-
posing disabling restrictions on persons identifiably a part of a deriva-
tive class created by that benign discrimination, the original issue of
equal protection re-emerges. Accepted for review in the Court's cur-
rent term is a case from the state of Washington which turned on the
constitutionality of such benign discrimination." 4  The law school of
the state university had identified in ethnic and racial minorities a spe-
cial class of persons that had suffered restricting discrimination in the
historical past. As a result these minorities had been effectively
barred from access to a legal education, and as a consequence denied
participation in the legal profession.
As a state agency the university argued its responsibility as a pub-
lic agency to take affirmative action to find and apply a corrective
measure. The state's supreme court agreed that the preferred admis-
sions of the members of these groups was the appropriate corrective,
even though the effect of the state action was detrimental to persons
not members of the favored class; but for the discriminatory admis-
sions policy, they would have gained a seat in the law school.' 5 The
state court found that, in accommodating the need to open the doors
of its law school to these minorities, the state had a "compelling in-
terest" which would justify the restriction the university's actions put
on those excluded. 10 The Court could have decided whether the
action of the university as an arm of the state has created a deriva-
tive class; if so, whether that class, white males, has been deprived
of any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; and if
so, whether there is the requisite compelling state interest with no
viable alternative justifying such discrimination.
The same questions are raised relative to the unwillingly preg-
nant wife, for if her husband is extended the right to participate in
her abortion decision, he is being extended the right to intrude on
112. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965).
114. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), cert. granted,
No. 73-235, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973).
115. Id. at 22, 507 P.2d at 1184.
116. Id. at 25, 507 P.2d at 1187.
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her personal right to privacy. Benign discrimination in his behalf is
restrictive and disabling discrimination against the woman who is mar-
ried. Where the unmarried woman is free to make her decision in
accordance with medical advice and, when applicable, state require-
ments, the married woman would be denied that freedom. Granting
the husband power to consent or withhold consent, the state would
be forcing upon the married woman the hazards of pregnancy and
childbirth she could otherwise avoid.
Summarizing the interests
Where there is conflict between personal and proprietary interests
which are protectable under the Constitution, and where any resolu-
tion of that conflict is based on a classification of the persons whose
interests are in conflict, a valid claim for equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment arises; and, the interests to be affected by un-
equal treatment must be weighed and balanced. 117
Here the proposed classifications are "expectant parent, husband"
and "expectant parent, wife." Both are persons of standing under
the law, and both may claim the support of the state in protecting
their individual and fundamental rights. The prospective father claims
a right to equal participation in the abortion decision, while the wife
would preserve that decision to herself. Where the husband seeks
to protect his personal and proprietary interests in a future child by
seeking the power of consent to the destruction of the fetus, the wife
seeks to protect her personal interest in her present mental and physi-
cal health by keeping safe her right to privacy. The husband desires
an extension of his rights by the state's benign discrimination in his
behalf as a member of the special class, "expectant parent, husband,"
and seeks a measure of participation in his wife's decision to abort.
The wife requires equal protection with that extended by the Abortion
Cases to all other unwillingly pregnant women, ensuring her full liber-
ty under the law to chose abortion.
The husband's claim for discriminatory treatment grows out of
the contractual relationship he shares with his wife, and is measurable
by the benefits that accrue to him by dint of his parenthood. De-
fined principally by tort law, and to a lesser extent by the law of prop-
erty, they include tangibles such as the value of services and earnings
of the future child as well as the intangibles of companionship, pa-
rental pride, and filial affection.
Recognizing any compensable legal interest in the parents of the
stillborn fetus is of recent development in the law of torts, and has
depended upon judicial construction of the local wrongful death stat-
utes. It is arguable that such applications of the statutes depend upon
117. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969).
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a presumption that a child capable of present life actually exists even
though yet en ventre sa mere, and so, do not truly represent an ac-
knowledgement of parental interests in a fetus. However, assuming
for the sake of argument that these cases do represent a recognition
of substantial interest in fetal existence, the value of the father's poten-
tial loss as a result of the destruction of the fetus is the value of his
expectancy; under the liberalized tort law of those jurisdictions, that
value is measured in terms of the material benefits accruing to him
by his parenthood. Neither his personal life nor liberty is threatened,
although the disappointment or sorrow at the loss of his future child
may amount to a threat to his mental health. His interests are prin-
cipally economic, prospective, and contingent, and their realization is
largely dependent upon the live birth of the child.
The wife's claim for protection equal to that extended to all other
unwillingly pregnant women is based on her personal right to privacy
in matters relating to the protection of her physical and mental health.
A personal and not a property right, it is far more precious than mere
property rights, and escapes meaningful economic measure. As one
of those fundamental rights so "essential to ordered liberty," her per-
sonal privacy cannot be invaded unless a superior interest is thereby
served. The value of her loss if denied exclusive control of the abor-
tion decision is the value of her physical and mental health, and po-
tentially, her life. Her interests are personal, immediate, and real.
From initial appearances, the state's interest in encouraging the
rearing of children within a familial unit bound together by marriage
lends support to the husband's claim for special treatment. However,
making a special grant of consensual power to him would have an
effect that is immediately and directly contrary to now well-established
policy in all jurisdictions across the nation; despite a century's progress
in removing long traditional disabilities, such a special grant of power
would place married women under a new disability not shared by other
women. In the light of the contemporary movement to remove the
extra-legal social disabilities all women are subject to, creating such
a new legal disability binding married women could only be a retro-
grade step.
A statute regulating abortion and granting consensual powers to
the prospective father, to be in accord with the requirements of Roe
v. Wade,118 would probably have to limit interference by the prospec-
tive father to the final trimester of pregnancy; his interests are rela-
tively remote prior to the sixth month of fetal development. On the
other hand, protection of the woman's physical and mental health by
avoiding the hazards of full-term pregnancy and birth of the unwanted
118. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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child is most effectively and safely accomplished prior to the conclu-
sion of the second trimester.119 In view of the practices surrounding
the donation of tissue for human transfer and the applications of the
wrongful death statutes under tort law, even in the most liberal of
jurisdictions, such a limitation of consent to the third trimester is well
justified.
Striking the balance
Such a statute extending participatory consent to the prospective father
would serve the purpose of preserving his present expectations in the
contingent benefits of family life; however, it would deprive the wom-
an of her right to act privately in protecting and preserving her health.
Furthermore, such a statutory provision would grant the man powers
equal to, yet independent of and potentially contrary to the
state's power in determining the legality of abortion in the final tri-
mester.
Where the effects of a statutory classification of persons are eco-
nomic or proprietary, the standard for application of the equal protec-
tion clause is significantly different from that where the effects are
in deprivation of personal civil liberties. 2 ' Constitutional decisions
distinguish clearly between them, and during the last thirty years the
Court has consistently supported class distinctions whose effects are
economic if the distinctions drawn are not patently unreasonable.' 2 '
But where the class distinctions impose a restriction on the exercise
of fundamental civil liberties, the Court has just as consistently de-
clared the class "suspect" and required an affirmative showing of a
"compelling state interest" served by the discriminator treatment and
justifying that restriction.' 22  Where the classification cannot meet that
stringent test, it is declared unconstitutional as in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
As between the man's economic and the woman's personal inter-
ests, the weight of constitutional considerations appears to fall on her
side of the scale. In enacting regulatory legislation relating to the
man's participation in the abortion decison, the state legislatures will
need to recognize that the heavier burden lies with the woman denied
private and independent choice, and that the higher constitutional pur-
pose is served by protecting her personal and immediate interests over
the husband's largely contingent ones.
119. See statistics cited in note 31, supra.
120. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
121. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
122. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
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